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ACTIVE EUTHANASIA: CAN IT BE JUSTIFIED?
Francis A. Molenda*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a village nursing home in Holland, a ninety-four year-old woman,
bedridden and unable to feed herself, refused to allow her broken hip to
be repaired. As a result, she experienced extreme pain. In response to
that pain she pleaded with her doctor to end her life. After several inter-
views which convinced the doctor and a colleague that she did not want
to go on any longer and that there was nothing more they could do to
ease her pain, they agreed to her request. She bid an emotional farewell
to her son and daughter-in-law and then received one injection to put her
to sleep, another to assure unconsciousness, and a third injection of cu-
rare which brought about respiratory arrest.' Although prosecuted, the
doctors involved were finally acquitted.'
Roswell Gilbert described himself as a professional scientist and his
wife as a fine lady.' Nevertheless, he walked up to her, pointed a loaded
revolver at her head, and killed her. He took these actions because his
wife of fifty-one years, Emily, suffered from Alzheimer's disease. She
* Associated with the firm of Pray, Walker, Jackman, Williamson & Marlar, Tulsa,
Oklahoma. B.S., M.A., Loyola University at Chicago; J.D., The University of Tulsa. Member of
the Oklahoma Bar. The author would like to acknowledge the kind assistance of Higdon Rogers for
information concerning the Hemlock Society.
1. Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
2. Id. at 6, col. 2.
3. Dying With Dignity (KTLA television broadcast, Apr. 4, 1987).
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was incontinent and was mentally aware for only brief moments.4 In
those moments she begged to die. Gilbert saw the termination of her
suffering as his mission. He was prosecuted for murder in the first degree
and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison by a Florida jury in 1985.
These are only two cases out of many which reflect the varying re-
sponses of different governments to active euthanasia: the active inter-
vention to cause the painless death of a hopelessly sick or terminally ill
person. A number of state court opinions and living will statutes which
accept passive euthanasia, the disconnection of life-sustaining equipment,
suggest that the United States is in a posture to accept and legalize active
euthanasia.
Although the battle lines became clearly drawn in the 1980's when
debate over active euthanasia reached a fever pitch, the issue of the be-
nevolent taking of a life has stretched across the history of the human
race. From the common law treatment of suicide, through the changing
attitudes toward compassionate crimes in which disease prompts the tak-
ing of life by loved ones, this nation and western society as a whole have
moved toward the condonation of active euthanasia.
The American public has come to realize that the real issue is indi-
vidual choice and that realization has been reflected in various court de-
cisions, most particularly those of the New Jersey Supreme Court.5 The
rights of the individual must prevail over the less compelling state inter-
ests in sustaining life. This recognition by the people of the United States
must result in statutes which, although containing broad safeguards, will
permit supervised aid in dying.
II. SUICIDE AND THE COMMON LAW
Plato saw active euthanasia as a remedy for unbearable pain. In
ancient India and Sardinia, it was viewed as custom for the aged and
infirm.6 With the ascendancy of religion, however, the taking of a life, no
matter what the motive, was condemned: life and death were the domain
of God and not his creations.7
The common law mirrored religion's view of the taking of life, even
4. Mercy Or Murder (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 11, 1987).
5. In 1987 the New Jersey Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases addressing passive eutha-
nasia: In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419
(1987); and In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). See infra notes 65-86 and accompanying
text.
6. Note, The Right of the Terminally Ill To Die, With Assistance If Necessary, 8 CRiM. JUsT. J.
403, 404 (1986).
7. Id.
[Vol. 24:165
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by oneself. Suicide was considered a felony, a crime against God and
state, as was assisting suicide. So heinous was suicide that the penalties
included surrender of all personal property I and ignominious burial."0
The common law was, of course, applied in the United States, but
with varying penalties. In Connecticut, although property was not for-
feited, ignominious burials took place. " Massachusetts law spoke of bur-
ying a suicide's corpse on a highway with a cart-load of stones laid on the
grave as a "brand of infamy" and warning to others.12 In an 1816 deci-
sion a Massachusetts court addressed the issue of assisting suicide in a
case where one prisoner persuaded the occupant of an adjoining cell to
take his own life.13 There the court concluded that the murder of one's
self is a felony, and one who counsels, advises, or assists another to com-
mit suicide is guilty of murder as a principal. 4
The Field Penal Code defined suicide as the intentional taking of
one's life.15 Although the Code eliminated property forfeiture, it found
aiding suicide, attempting suicide, and aiding the attempt to be crimi-
nal. 6 In 1903 an Illinois court concluded that suicide was not a felony,
but assisting suicide was murder.17
Texas courts took a far different point of view. In Sanders v. State, a
1908 decision, the court held that neither suicide nor furnishing the
means for it was a crime.18 However, the person assisting could not
shoot the gun or put the poison in the mouth of another.'9 Several de-
cades later, in 1973, Texas passed a statute criminalizing the assistance of
suicide."0
Recently the California Supreme Court considered a suicide pact
where two teenagers vowed to drive off a cliff.21 One survived. The
8. Id. at 418.
9. Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 63
(1985) [hereinafter Marzen].
10. Id. An ignominious burial included being laid to rest on the highway with a stake driven
through the body. 1d. (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *189).
11. Id. at 65.
12. Id.
13. Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816).
14. Id. at 360-61.
15. Marzen, supra note 9, at 76-77. The Field Code was adopted in the Dakota Territory in
1877 and Oklahoma Territory in 1890, among others. Id.
16. Id.
17. Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E. 505 (1903).
18. Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 112 S.W. 68 (1908), overruled on other grounds, Aven
v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 478, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925).
19. Id. at 105, 112 S.W. at 70.
20. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (Vernon 1974).
21. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 667 P.2d 1176, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1983).
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court noted that suicide is an expression of mental illness and that psy-
chiatrists currently view attempted suicide as a symptom of mental ill-
ness. 22 However, the court distinguished aiding suicide on the grounds
that it could be done for personal motives of the abettor, threatened the
sanctity of life, and is not accompanied by the ameliorating factor of
mental illness.23
The American Law Institute's 1962 Model Penal Code proposed to
make causing suicide by force, duress, or deception a criminal homicide,
and to make aiding another's suicide a felony of the second degree.24
The Institute proposed that penalties for assisting suicide should be miti-
gated where unselfish motive was involved, but thought that decision best
left to the court at the time of sentencing.25 A wide majority of states
currently prohibit assisting suicide.26
III. COMPASSIONATE CRIMES
Although the vast majority of states currently prohibit assisting sui-
cide, statutory provisions will not always deter the actions of otherwise
peaceful citizens. There has been a continuing saga of tragedies in this
country in which one person has taken the life of another for reasons
other than force, duress, or deception. Usually, each occasion has been
followed by invasive accounts of the personal lives of the participants in
headline grabbing fashion.
In 1938 Harry Johnson asphyxiated his wife who was dying from
cancer. A grand jury refused to indict him after a psychiatrist de-
scribed him as temporarily insane.28
Otto Werner pled guilty to a murder charge after suffocating his
22. Id. at 434, 667 P.2d at 1179, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (citing Comment, The Punishment of
Suicide - A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REv. 463, 469 (1969)).
23. Id. at 437, 667 P.2d at 1181, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
25. Marzen, supra note 9, at 95.
26. Id. at 97. Twenty-six states plus Puerto Rico have statutes outlawing assisting suicide:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin. Three states hold assistors guilty of murder as a principal: Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio. Seven
jurisdictions could penalize assisting suicide under the common law: Alabama, West Virginia, Vir-
ginia, Tennessee, Maryland, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia. The remaining states
have not prohibited suicide and therefore would probably not penalize it. Id. at 97-98 & n.643.
27. Note, supra note 6, at 414 n.74 (citing N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1938, at 46, col. 1).
28. Id.
[Vol. 24:165
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sixty-three year-old crippled, bedridden wife. 9 He was allowed to with-
draw the plea after his family testified to the devotion and care he had
given his wife, as well as the request to die made by his wife.3° In consid-
eration of these facts, the judge stated: "I can't find it in my heart to find
you guilty."'"
In 1967 Robert Waskin shot and killed his ifiother. Suffering from
terminal leukemia, she had begged her twenty-three year-old son to end
her life. Waskin was found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity
and released upon a finding that he was no longer insane.32
In 1984 Wallace Cooper killed his terminally ill uncle who had been
suffering from coronary heart disease, anemia, an aneurysm, and Crohn's
disease.33 He had told Cooper that he wanted help in being put out of his
misery.34 Cooper, a nurse at Los Angeles County U.S.C. Medical
Center, injected his uncle with a lethal dose of morphine and Lanoxin.
Cooper was eventually placed on five years' probation and fined $100
after being found guilty of involuntary manslaughter.35
Unlike the scenarios described above, not every situation in which
suffering was brought to an end through the assistance of another was
heard in the courtroom, or even aired in the newspaper, at least initially.
On June 1, 1983, Lolly and Gronky Martin shared a bottle of Jack Dan-
iels with a single glass. 36 In addition to the whiskey, they each swal-
lowed enough white powder made from crushed tranquilizer tablets to
cause certain death.37 Four months shy of their fiftieth wedding anniver-
sary, Lolly and Gronky Martin chose to "terminate their terminal
illnesses. ' 38
Lois "Lolly" Martin, a retired psychologist and counselor for Los
Angeles public schools, suffered from emphysema. She was unable to
walk, talk, or stand up straight without severe breathing difficulties, and
was attached to an oxygen machine twenty-four hours a day. Paul
29. Id. at 415 n.74 (citing People v. Werner (Crim. Ct., Cook County, Ill., 1958). A transcript
of the case was presented in Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 178, 184-87
n.15 (1966)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Chicago Tribune, Aug. 9, 1967, at 1, col. 8; Chicago Tribune, Aug. 10, 1967, at
1, col. 2).
33. Id at 415-16 n.74. (citing L.A. Daily J., Jan. 8, 1986, at 5, col. 3). See also Wickett, Law
Rejects 'Euthanasia' Defense, HEMLOCK Q., July, 1985, at 1.
34. Id.
35. Note, supra note 6, at 415-16 n.74 (citing L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 8, 1986, at 5, col.3).
36. Fadiman, The Liberation of Lolly and Gronky, LiFE, Dec., 1986, at 71.
37. Id.
38. Id.
19881
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"Gronky" Martin, the former president of Compton Community Col-
lege, was in the final stages of congestive heart disease, subject to halluci-
nations, and unable to control his bladder. Their children and
grandchildren noted that the two seemed to have a purpose to their lives
as well as a greater awareness of their surroundings once they made their
decision."
Lolly and Gronky are a case study of an American societal dilemma
of major proportions. Although traditional societies revere their elders
for their wisdom, in the United States their knowledge is often consid-
ered to be obsolete.' In addition, the sense of family that once existed in
the United States has eroded. Twenty-five years ago Americans over
sixty-five years of age were twice as likely to live with their children as
they are today.41 In 1987 the overwhelming majority of older citizens
lived alone, with their spouses, or in nursing homes where they were
more often than not drugged into a sedated state, afforded little respect,
and treated with condescension. 42
Rather than face the "nightmare" of growing old in America, the
Martins sought a final respectable solution. 43 Lolly initially tried to slit
her wrists, but the attempt failed. After seeing a television talk show
discussion featuring Derek Humphry, director of the Hemlock Society,
she wrote to Humphry. Three months later she received the Society's
handbook on how to commit suicide.' Meticulously following the sug-
gestions of the book, Lolly prepared the appropriate amount of tranquil-
izer, poured the whiskey, and brought a peaceful end to the misery she
and Gronky faced.45
The Hemlock Society, an organization which assists people like the
Martins in reaching their goal, was founded in 1980 by Derek Humphry.
It currently consists of more than 19,000 members throughout the
United States.46 The Society is a leading proponent of "self-deliverance"
and "death with dignity": autonomy in ending one's own life when con-
fronted with the pain and misery of disease. Its general principles in-
clude a belief that the final decision to terminate life is ultimately an
39. Id. at 90.
40. Id. at 72.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 72.
44. Id. at 80.
45. Id. at 71.
46. HEMLOCK Q., Oct. 1987, at 1.
[Vol. 24:165
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individual one. The action, and most importantly its timing, is consid-
ered a very personal decision. The Society believes that whenever possi-
ble the decision should be made with family and friends.47
The Society publishes books and a quarterly newsletter, conducts
panel discussions, and holds regular meetings among its twenty-three
chapters throughout the United States. Its political action wing, Ameri-
cans Against Human Suffering (AAHS), was established on July 18,
1986, with the goal of changing state laws "to permit physician aid-in-
dying for the terminally ill."48 The group attempted to gather sufficient
signatures to place its proposed assistance-in-dying statute on the Cali-
fornia ballot via initiative in November, 1988. Although the effort
failed, the group will attempt to put the question on the ballot in 1990.50
IV. JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
If there is a logical pathway to legislation authorizing the adminis-
tration of drugs to terminate human life, it follows the strong precedent
of recent court decisions and legislative action addressing living wills.
The courts of several states have come to recognize the right to be
free of artificial support systems. In the Karen Ann Quinlan case,51 a
New Jersey court held that the constitutional right of privacy extends to
the decision to disconnect life-prolonging equipment when there is no
reasonable possibility that the patient can return to a cognitive, sapient
state.52 A Massachusetts court found in 1977 that the right to decline
chemotherapy extends to a mentally incompetent person if the court de-
termines that the patient would have refused treatment when compe-
tent.53 In a similar case, a New York court balanced compelling state
47. Membership Application Form, The National Hemlock Society, inserted in HEMLOCK Q,
Oct. 1987.
48. R. RISLEY, A HUMANE AND DIGNIFIED DEATH, xii (1987).
49. Derek Humphry, Address to the Oklahoma Chapter Meeting of the Hemlock Society (Sept.
16, 1987). Four hundred fifty thousand signatures are required in California, 5% of the last guber-
natorial vote. Id.
50. Telephone interview with Derek Humphry, Executive Director of the Hemlock Society
(Aug. 30, 1988).
51. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Karen Ann
Quinlan was in a drug/alcohol-induced coma, suffering from irreversible brain damage, and appar-
ently sustained by a respirator. When her father signed a release allowing for the respirator to be
disconnected, litigation ensued. The family prevailed, but Quinlan lived 10 years without the respi-
rator, fed through tubes until her body finally gave out in July, 1985. D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKETT,
THE RIGHT TO DIE 107-08 (1986).
52. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
53. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977).
1988]
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interests against the individual's constitutional right of privacy and con-
cluded that when there is clear and convincing evidence of a comatose,
terminally ill patient's intent to refuse treatment, and certain medical cri-
teria are satisfied, the individual's rights will prevail.54
A Florida court went a step further by affirming the right of a hus-
band to authorize the discontinuance of nasogastric nutrition for his wife
who was irreversibly comatose. 5 Similar decisions have been rendered
in California,5 6 Arizona,57 and Massachusetts. 8 As those cases under-
score, the courts have come to see no distinction between removing life-
sustaining equipment and halting artificial hydration and nutrition. 9
A California court has found that even when a competent, adult
patient is not comatose, there is a constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment.' In Bartling v. Superior Court the court noted that the pa-
tient's right was found in the penumbra of rights guaranteed by the fifth
and ninth amendments.6 The court did, however, concede that the right
was to be balanced against interests of the state in preserving life,
preventing suicide, maintaining ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion, and protecting innocent third parties.62
The Bartling court found the patient's rights prevailed because he
had made oral and written statements of his desire. Moreover, in ad-
dressing the question of suicide, the court held that disconnecting a ven-
tilator did not cause death by unnatural means, but rather merely served
to hasten an inevitable death by natural causes.63 Unfortunately, the
court's decision came too late for Bartling, who succumbed while still
attached to the equipment. 64
To date the most dramatic judicial opinions have been handed down
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. That court's 1976 decision in In re
Quinlan signalled a new era in the right to die debate. Moreover, the
54. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
55. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1331
(Fla. 1986).
56. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
57. Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtained From Families of Adult Patients to Withhold
or Withdraw Treatment, 258 J. A.M.A. 229, 231 n.44 (1987) (citing Rasmussen v. Fleming, No. 2
CA-CIV 5622 (Ariz. Ct. App., June 1986)).
58. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (patient in persis.
tent vegetative state who could have lived decades if nutrition maintained).
59. Areen, supra note 57, at 232.
60. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App.3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
61. Id. at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 225.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 196-97, 209 Cal. Rptr. 226.
64. Dying with Dignity (KTLA television broadcast, Apr. 4, 1987).
[Vol. 24:165
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1987 ruling in the monumental Farrell-Peter-Jobes6 5 trilogy marked the
clearest recognition of the patient's rights thus far.
The trilogy of 1987 New Jersey cases addressed the rights of three
women suffering from irreversible and incurable medical conditions.
Kathleen Farrell, thirty-seven, suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclero-
sis (Lou Gehrig's disease). Because the incurable affliction left her mind
intact while her body shut down, Mrs. Farrell was able to request re-
moval of a respirator as a competent patient.66 Hilda Peter, a sixty-five
year-old nursing home resident in a persistent vegetative state, had been
sustained by a nasogastric tube for over two years.67 A close friend and
guardian requested that the tube be removed. Nancy Jobes was a thirty-
one year-old nursing home resident also in a persistent vegetative state.
Her husband requested removal of the J-tube which sustained her.68
Neither Ms. Peter nor Mrs. Jobes was expected to die within a year.69
In In re Farrell the court noted a well-recognized common law right
of self-determination, but also identified countervailing state interests in
sustaining a person's life.70 The court found that Mrs. Farrell's right
outweighed the state's interests and set out the criteria to be applied
when patients living at home request the discontinuance of life-sustaining
medical treatment.71 The patient must be competent, as determined by
two non-attending physicians. The physicians must also inform the pa-
tient of the prognosis, alternative treatments available, and the risk in-
volved in withdrawing treatment. Moreover, the patient's decision must
be voluntary and without coercion.72 The Farrell court also held that
judicial review of the competent patient's refusal of treatment was appro-
priate only under unusual circumstances73 and that there would be no
civil or criminal penalties imposed on persons who withdrew life-sus-
taining equipment in good faith reliance on the established procedures. 74
65. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419
(1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
66. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 344, 529 A.2d at 408.
67. Peter, 108 N.J. at 370, 529 A.2d at 422.
68. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 400, 529 A.2d at 437. A jejunostomy tube, or J-tube, is a tube inserted
through a hole cut into the abdomen by which hydration and nutrition are maintained.
69. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 341, 529 A.2d at 407.
70. Id. at 349, 529 A.2d at 411. The state interests noted by the court were similar to those
identified in Bartling: preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical
profession, and protecting innocent third parties. Id.
71. Id. at 353-54, 529 A.2d at 413.
72. IM at 354, 529 A.2d at 413.
73. Id. at 357, 529 A.2d at 415. Conflict among physicians, or among family members, or
between physicians and family members or other health care professionals, would constitute unusual
circumstances. Id.
74. Id. at 358, 529 A.2d at 415-16.
1988]
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In In re Peter75 the court addressed the rights of a patient who had
left a power of attorney authorizing a friend to make health care deci-
sions for her. The court recognized that the medical preferences of the
patient were paramount and rejected objective tests that had previously
been applied to support surrogate decisions.7 6 The real issue, in the opin-
ion of the court, was whether there was clear and convincing evidence
that, if competent, the patient would reject the treatment.77
Procedurally, the Peter court required ombudsman oversight, two
independent medical opinions,78 and appointment of a guardian in the
absence of a close family member or a specifically designated surrogate
decisionmaker.79 Significantly, the court noted that "[i]f there is clear
and convincing evidence that a patient has designated a family member
or close friend to make surrogate medical decisions, upon receipt of the
two medical confirmations the Ombudsman should defer any decisions
concerning life-support to the designated decisionmaker." 0 According
to the court, deference should be given to a close family member in the
absence of a designated decisionmaker.
Finally, in In re Jobes,8 t the court laid down procedures for dealing
with a patient in a persistent vegetative state who had failed to express an
attitude toward life-sustaining treatment prior to becoming incompe-
tent.82 The court held that the "substituted judgment" standard estab-
lished in Quinlan provided the best resolution.83 By that standard, a
surrogate, typically a family member, considers the patient's prior state-
ments regarding medical issues as well as "all the facets of the patient's
personality."84 From those considerations the surrogate determines what
treatment the patient would have wanted. The surrogate then secures
75. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
76. Id. at 373, 529 A.2d at 423. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). Conroy
held that an ombudsman could approve a surrogate's decision to disconnect or withhold treatment
when an elderly, incompetent nursing home patient was involved and a subjective, limited objective,
or objective test was met, depending on the circumstances. Id. See infra note 131 and accompany-
ing text.
77. Peter, 108 N.J. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425.
78. Id. at 384, 529 A.2d at 429. The medical opinions are to confirm the patient's condition,
alternatives available, risks involved, likely outcome of discontinued treatment, and possibility of the
patient's recovery to a cognitive, sapient state. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
82. Id. at 399, 529 A.2d at 436.
83. Id. at 414-15, 529 A.2d at 444 45.
84. Id.
[Vol. 24:165
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss2/1
ACTIVE EUTHANASIA
statements from two independent physicians "knowledgeable in neurol-
ogy" to the effect that the patient has no chance of recovering to a cogni-
tive, sapient state .8  The statement of the attending physician, if there is
one, is also required. Once again, neither civil nor criminal liability is
imposed on the surrogate, and judicial review is necessary only when
there is disagreement.86
Throughout the trilogy, the court spoke in terms of respecting the
will of the patient, whether stated by a competent patient, or through a
surrogate. Moreover, the court was most cognizant of the patient's right
to self-determination and the role of the family. These factors outweigh
the state's interests in the vast majority of situations.
The earlier New Jersey Supreme Court decision in In re Quinlan87
not only established the trend in the courts that recognized the rights of
the patient, but also seemed to usher in statutory reform. In 1977 fifty
bills providing for living will statutes were introduced in thirty-eight
states.88 By 1987 thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia had
passed the statutes which, in essence, provide competent adults a means
to give directions for health care if they become terminally ill and unable
to direct their own care.8 9
With this impetus the Hemlock Society, and its political wing,
AAHS, proposed legislation which carried living will statutes and court
decisions one step further. Brushing aside the courts' concerns about
suicide, the Society proposes a Directive to Physicians.90 This instru-
ment would make the patient's physician an attorney-in-fact with the
power to decide the time of death so long as the physician acts in accord-
ance with the desires of the patient. The proposal would allow the pa-
tient to indicate a desire to reject artificial life sustaining systems and to
have a physician administer aid-in-dying in a "humane and dignified
manner."
91
The proposal contains a number of substantive and procedural safe-
guards. It requires the opinion of two physicians that the illness is termi-
nal. The instrument is valid for seven years if the patient is competent,
but can be revoked orally. If the patient is incompetent, the instrument
remains in effect as long as the incompetency continues. The proposal
85. Id. at 422, 529 A.2d at 448.
86. Id. at n.15.
87. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
88. D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKET-r, supra note 57, at 108.
89. Areen, supra note 57, at 230.
90. RISLEY, supra note 48, at 30-33.
91. Id.
1988]
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requires that the instrument be signed by two present and uninterested
witnesses and places limitations on the attorney-in-fact allowing the
court to take away the power should the agent act contrary to the known
desires of the patient.92 Moreover, the directive is to have no force and
effect during the term of a pregnancy. 93 The proposed statute closely
follows standard terms of accepted living wills and durable powers of
attorney with one important distinction: it permits assistance in dying.
V. RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION AND NON-RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS
The concept of aid-in-dying raised heated argument long before the
existence of the Hemlock Society. No opponent of the practice has been
more effective than the Roman Catholic Church.
The leaders of the Catholic Church have condemned euthanasia for
centuries. Augustine wrote that there was no divine precept or permis-
sion to take one's life.94 He taught that the Sixth Commandment forbade
suicide unless it was necessary to avoid dishonor, or was requested by
God or State, such as in war or capital punishment. 95 Aquinas viewed
suicide as sinful and cited three reasons to condemn it. First, it was con-
trary to natural inclinations toward self-preservation and charity; second,
it injured the community of which all persons are members; thitd, it vio-
lated God's rights over his creation, man.96
Pope Pius XII drew some distinctions relevant to the modern de-
bate. In a 1957 speech he stated that respirators were extraordinary mea-
sure which were not required.97 Thus, prolonging life by mechanical
equipment was not necessary. 98 Pope Paul VI, however, stated that the
right to life is inalienable and grievously violated by abortion and eutha-
nasia.9 9 The Declaration on Euthanasia,"°° authorized by Pope John
Paul II in 1980, reiterated the Church's view that life is a gift of God's
love and stated that no one can permit the killing of one suffering from
an incurable disease or consent to it, explicitly or implicitly.
A recent California decision, Bouvia v. Superior Court, 1 prompted
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Marzen, supra note 9, at 27.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 29.
97. G. LARUE, EUTHANASIA AND RELIGION 27 (1985).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 28.
100. Id.
101. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
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a debate with the Catholic Church on the subject of euthanasia. 0 2 In a
logical extension of the Bartling decision, the court held that the state
could not force a nasogastric tube into a patient's body. Archbishop
Roger Mahony of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles found the decision to
be an open invitation to euthanasia and "perhaps eventually [to] the
elimination even of those who do not want to die.' 0 Mahony argued
that a physician has a commitment to relieve pain, but not by every pos-
sible means. Moreover, he asserted that society should rule out efforts
aimed at shortening life.
The key to Mahony's position is that a moral balance must be
achieved that clearly distinguishes between eliminating the burdens in-
herent in the patient's condition and avoiding the additional burdens that
a particular procedure will impose."° Mahony takes no exception to the
denial of additional medical treatment that would cause "significant pain,
discomfort, risk or even dehumanization."' 5 He interprets the court's
decision, however, to be based on its determination that Bouvia's situa-
tion was hopeless and her life unenjoyable and, therefore, meaningless
because it had lost quality, dignity, and purpose.10 6 Mahony strongly
believes that the decision to tolerate life's passing away belongs to the
patient, not the court, and should be based on the burden caused by life
sustaining treatment.10 7
Opposition to aid-in-dying also finds secular support.'0 8 In
Mahony's opinion, decisions such as those in Bouvia set the stage for a
Nazi-like disregard of human life.'0 9 That same concern was voiced by
Leo Alexander, psychiatrist and consultant to the Secretary of War on
duty at the Nuremberg war trials." 0 Alexander wrote from the unparal-
leled vantage point of a witness to the atrocities exacted upon the human
102. Mahony, Elizabeth Bouvia Versus Superior Court, L.A. LAW., Dec. 1986, at 30. The fea-
ture also included the opposing view of Fred Okrand, legal director emeritus of the ACLU Founda-
tion of Southern California.
103. Id. at 33.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 32.
106. Id. at 33.
107. Id. at 32, 33.
108. See generally G. LARUE, supra note 97. Larue's survey of attitudes disclosed that spokes-
men for the world's religions generally oppose active euthanasia. There are, however, some excep-
tions. Unitarians take no position on the issue. Id. at 118. The Hindu sect of Jainism demand
euthanasia in certain circumstances. Id. at 134.
109. Mahony, supra note 102, at 30.
110. Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW. ENG. J. MED., July 14, 1949, at
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race by the Third Reich. He noted that a starting point for Hitler's medi-
cal programs was a directive for euthanasia issued on September 1, 1939.
That directive quickly grew into a practice of annihilation in which the
useless were exterminated. 111
Alexander queried whether such practices could develop in the
United States. He questioned if a utilitarian society, in which doctors
who have acquired a sense of omnipotence were threatened by people
who could not be cured, might be the stage for a return to "killing
centers."
1 12
Alexander, who warned against "small beginnings," was followed a
decade later by Yale Kamisar. Kamisar espoused a non-religious opposi-
tion to euthanasia relying heavily on the "wedge" theory. 3 He con-
tended that the euthanasia movement is based on the belief "that there is
such a thing as life not worthy to be lived." '14 The centerpiece of his
theory is that once a wedge opens the door by allowing the death of the
non-rehabilitative ill, an entire state of mind is triggered which could
allow the elimination of the socially unproductive and ideologically
unwanted. 1 5
Kamisar set forth certain practical concerns that lead him to ques-
tion whether someone who is terminally ill could be relied upon to state
true opinions on anything, let alone an opinion on being put to death. He
illustrated this point with the example of a person so ravaged with pain
that judgment is distorted. 6 He worried that even if a person's choice is
clear and uneffected by disease or pain the decision may be based on the
wrong criteria. He also feared that the euthanasia process could become
dangerously over-inclusive by sweeping up some individuals who have
the desire to live, but feel that they should die. Such feelings often arise
when the chronically ill believe that they have become emotional and
economic burdens to their families.11
Thirty years later, in response to the Hemlock Society's announced
plans for a proposed aid-in-dying statute, C. Everett Koop, Surgeon Gen-
eral of the United States, followed the path travelled by Alexander and
11. Id.
112. Id. at 45. The analogy to the current AIDS epidemic leaves a chilling inference.
113. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42
MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958).
114. Id. at 1031-32 (citing Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEw ENG. J.
MED., July 14, 1949, at 39, 44).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 987.
117. Id, at 990.
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Kamisar." 8 Writing from the perspective of a later generation, and in
the wake of court decisions and living will statutes, Koop and co-author
Edward R. Grant found a legal climate that encouraged the legalization
of euthanasia. They support this finding by pointing to living will stat-
utes. They found the statutes to be unidirectional because they do not
permit the patient to request medical treatment. They allow patients
only to refuse treatment. 119
Koop and Grant posit that the emphasis on the right to die in living
wills establishes a public policy in favor of that right rather than the right
to request continuing medical treatment. 20 Living wills, in conjunction
with cost containment strategies of profit-motivated sectors of the health
care market, may, they caution, change the "right to die" to the "duty to
die."'' Moreover, they contend that the euthanasia movement has
seized upon this atmosphere to press for acceptance of living wills.122 In
lock step with Kamisar, they maintain that, although it is difficult to
oppose the prevention of prolonged, painful death, acceptance of that
approach creates the risk of compromising other fundamental principles
of our notion of justice. 23 Specifically, the price of maintaining the
rights of all citizens against the ethic of mercy killing may require that,
temporarily, others will have to continue living in pain, wanting to die. 124
Koop and Grant are troubled by the approval of the Uniform
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (URTIA) by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1985. They view the approval
as an endorsement of the march toward legalizing euthanasia led by the
living will acts.125 As they see it, URTIA's treatment of hydration and
nutrition as devices that can be withdrawn pursuant to a living will is
difficult to reconcile with its stated intent "to err on the side of preserving
life." 126
They see further support for the euthanasia movement in the Bouvia
118. Koop & Grant, The "Small Beginnings" of Euthanasia: Examining The Erosion In Legal
Prohibitions Against Mercy-Killing, 2 J. LAW, ETICS & PUB. POL'Y 585 (1986).
119. Id. at 600. Indiana and Arkansas are exceptions. The statutes of those states permit pa-
tients to request medical treatment. Id. at n.39.
120. Id. at 604-05.
121. Id. at 605.
122. Id. at 606-07.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 599.
126. Id at 612-13.
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decision.127 Like Mahony, they are distressed by the Bouvia court's con-
sideration of the individual's ignominy and humiliation caused by the
compromised state. Moreover, they interpret the concurring opinion of
Justice Compton to find "a fundamental and absolute right to commit
suicide, and to demand the assistance of others, including the medical
profession, if one is unable to perform the act."'' 28
The New Jersey Supreme Court decision in In re Conroy129 gave
Koop and Grant some hope.1 30 In Conroy the court found that adequate
proof of the patient's wishes was required in order to determine what life-
sustaining measures could be withdrawn and set forth three tests for de-
termining the wishes of the patient.13 ' Koop and Grant view those stan-
dards as draconian and limiting the circumstances for euthanasia.1 32
They see the trial court opinion in In re Jobes13 3 as expanding Conroy
(and Quinlan) to cover a patient who was not terminal even though pro-
foundly impaired.13 1
Koop and Grant propose that legislation is the answer to the control
of euthanasia and that certain categories of patients should be addressed
by the legislatures. 135 They contend that protecting vulnerable adults,
establishing minimal care guidelines, and protecting the right to consent
to treatment should be afforded citizens.1 36 They suggest that offices for
the protection of nursing home patients and others should be provided
127. Id at 629.
128. Id. at 631.
129. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
130. Koop & Grant, supra note 118, at 631. See supra note 76 and accompa9ying text.
131. Koop & Grant, supra note 118, at 623-25. The tests to be applied depend on whether the
patient has made a prior statement on the issue, and the precise content and circumstances of that
statement. Under the subjective test life-sustaining treatment would be withheld or withdrawn from
an incompetent patient when it was clear that the patient would have refused treatment. Under the
limited objective test there must be some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused
the treatment and the burdens of the patient's life markedly outweigh any physical pleasure, emo-
tional enjoyment or intellectual satisfaction. The pure objective test applies when the burdens of life
outweigh the benefits and further provisions of life sustaining treatment would be inhumane. Id.
(citing Conroy, 98 N.J. at 360-66, 486 A.2d at 1229-32).
132. Id. at 622.
133. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying
text.
134. Koop & Grant, supra note 118, at 628-29 n.139. The Surgeon General and Mr. Grant
wrote that the New Jersey Supreme Court would have a number of issues to resolve. Id. That Court
ultimately applied Quinlan's "substituted judgment" approach holding that Mrs. Jobes' husband
could decide to withdraw artificial feeding from the 31-year old patient. The court found that loved
ones "who support and care for the patient ... best understand the patient's personal values and
beliefs." Jobes, 108 N.J. at 427, 529 A.2d at 451.
135. The New Jersey Supreme Court would agree. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404
(1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); and In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434
(1987).
136. Koop & Grant, supra note 118, at 616-20.
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with ombudsmen who could investigate abuse of patients and withdrawal
of life-prolonging medical treatment. With respect to minimal care,
Koop and Grant insist that foregoing nutrition and hydration must be
strictly justifiable by medical criteria such as impossibility, imminent
death, and "futility due to inability to metabolize."' 37 Finally, they urge
informed consent and a right to request all appropriate medical attention
to accompany a right to refuse. A physician would be granted immunity,
under Koop and Grant's approach, only when good faith is shown and
medically appropriate decisions are made under a patient's directive. 138
Numerous other arguments against the euthanasia movement have
been raised. One author contends that support of "rational suicides"
would lead to clusters of suicides, epidemics, and repetitions of the Jones-
town, Guiana tragedy. 139 Others argue that statutes should retain ele-
ments of deterrence so that citizens would risk prosecution for the taking
of the life of a loved one in only "the most sincerely desperate cases." 14
A patient's rational choice may be drawn into question because decisions
made in advance may be rejected when the time comes. Medical error is
always possible, and safeguards against error may draw out the process
so that it is self-defeating. Terminal illness may be curable tomorrow.
There could be a negative impact on research, hospitals might kill those
who could not pay, and patient recovery rates would suffer if patients
gave up. 14
1
VI. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EUTHANASIA AND
THE HOLLAND EXPERIENCE
Those in support of euthanasia essentially occupy three camps.
Some rely on the Constitution and find a right to die. Others find sup-
port in the decriminalization of aid for the dying found in other Western
countries. Still others rely simply on logic and human compassion.
The argument for active euthanasia anchored in the contention that
there is a Constitutional right to die is based upon the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Roe v. Wade. 142 In that case the Court found that, in the
presence of psychological harm, the impairment of mental and physical
137. Id. at 618.
138. Id.
139. Marzen, supra note 9, at 139, 145. See also Gelfand, Euthanasia and the Terminally Il
Patient, 63 NEB. L. REv. 741 (1984) (outlining twelve basic components in support of the preserva-
tion of life).
140. Id. at 757.
141. Id. at 766-69.
142. 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
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health, and distress for all concerned, a right to an abortion springs from
the Constitutional right of privacy. It would seem to follow that individ-
uals would have the right to terminate their own lives for the same
considerations. 143
This position is usually coupled with practical guidelines for the reg-
ulation of voluntary active euthanasia. One author'" would require that
two doctors determine that the patient is terminally ill with less than six
months to live, that the decision of the patient be voluntary, that the
patient be legally competent and making an informed decision, and that
the least active means of effectuating death be used. Under those circum-
stances, the "judicial system" should honor a patient's decision on when
and how to die. Moreover, no criminal penalties should be imposed on
the individual helping the terminal patient to commit suicide.14
Another approach looks to the statutes of other nations in the West
as support for a revision of the criminal code in the United States. Both
the German and Swiss penal codes consider the motive of the actor in
grading the offense and sentencing the offender.146 Thus, when compas-
sion or the request of the person suffering motivates the act, a mitigated
sentence results. Moreover, a motive which is completely benevolent or
honorable results in total exculpation. On this basis, supporters of this
approach posit that motive could become an exculpatory element of our
criminal code. Similar arguments have been offered by authors reviewing
Canadian law. They contend that Canadian authorities have the power
to decline prosecution depending on the circumstances.1 47
Finally, there are those who assert that reason and human decency
should permit active, voluntary euthanasia. One theologian asserts that
it strains logic to permit the administration of morphine to a suffering
patient in quantities which eventually pyramid to fatal levels, but to pros-
ecute the single, massive dose of the same drug.148 The theologian sug-
gests that there may be circumstances when it would be acutely
143. Note, supra note 6, at 403.
144. Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 363 (1984).
145. Id. at 383.
146. Note, Euthanasia:" A Comparison of the Criminal Laws of Germany, Switzerland and the
United States, 6 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 533, 547 (1983).
147. Schiffer, Euthanasia and The Criminal Law, 42 U.T. FAC. L. REv. 93, 108 (1986) (citing
Law Reform Comm'n of Canada, Medical Treatment and Criminal Law, working paper No. 28, at
51 (Ottawa 1982)). See also, Carnerie, Euthanasia and Self-Determinism: Is There a Charter Right to
Die in Canada, 32 MCGILL L.J. 299-335 (1987) (finding a Canadian Constitutional right to die).
148. Lucyk, Theological Reflections on Euthanasia, 21 LAW Soc'Y OF UPPER CANADA GA-
zETrE, Mar. 1987, at 34-40.
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reasonable and therefore ethical to terminate a patient's life through
either affirmative action or designed neglect, rather than wait for disease
to run its natural course.149
The passive euthanasia, or termination of life-sustaining treatment,
permitted in the United States may also result in a painful death. 5 '
When dialysis equipment is disconnected a patient remains conscious
and experiences nausea, vomiting, gastrointestinal hemorrhage, inability
to concentrate, neuromuscular twitching, and convulsions. Death may
take weeks. Even the disconnection of a respirator may result in con-
scious air hunger lasting hours. 51 Once again, the position that adminis-
tering drugs to cause a painless death is illegal while disconnecting life-
support machinery is permitted, seems to defy logic.
Ironically, the nation of singular importance to the euthanasia
movement world-wide is the same nation that was extolled by Leo Alex-
ander in his condemnation of the Nazi's use of "mercy killing": the
Netherlands. 52 Although the Dutch contend that euthanasia is no more
common in Holland than anywhere else, 53 Holland is universally looked
upon as the one bastion of assisted dying.
Dr. Pieter V. Admiraal has indicated that a 1985 poll showed 67%
of the Dutch population supported active euthanasia. 5 4 He describes
"passive" euthanasia as merely a description of the attending physician's
attitude, noting that disconnecting equipment or discontinuing life-
lengthening drugs may cause the patient to suffer for weeks in the course
of dying.
Admiraal contends that there is no role for passive euthanasia
alone. 55 Rather, he believes death assisted by drugs is necessary when
euthanasia is considered. Admiraal defines euthanasia as an act in the
interests of an incurable patient which is done so that quick, peaceful
death ensues. He believes that future generations will question why "it
149. Maguire, The Freedom to Die, NEw THEOLOGY, No. 10, at 189 (1973).
150. Kuhse, The Case for Active Voluntary Euthanasia, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 145,
147 (1986).
151. Id.
152. Alexander, supra note 110, at 44. "It is to the everlasting honor of the medical profession
of Holland that they recognized the earliest and most subtle phases of this attempt and rejected it."
Id.
153. Telephone interview with Robert Haslach, Information Officer, Embassy of the Nether-
lands (Oct. 20, 1987). Haslach reports that the abortion rate in Holland is one-fourth that of the
United States and suggests that the rate of euthanasia in Holland is also actually lower than the rate
in this country. Id.
154. Pieter V. Admiraal, Address at the Anniversary Meeting of the Voluntary Euthanasia Soci-
ety of England and Wales, Apr. 14, 1985, reprinted in HEMLOCK Q., Oct., 1985, at 3-6.
155. Id. at 5.
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took so long for our generation to accept euthanasia unconditionally and
recognize it as a natural human right."' 15 6
Despite Admiraal's admission that active euthanasia is practiced in
Holland, it remains illegal even there. The Dutch Council of State, how-
ever, has proposals for a bill on euthanasia under consideration. Under
the proposed legislation the act would remain a criminal offense, but a
doctor could be exempted from prosecution or punishment under defined
conditions. 57 One effect of the legislation would be to legitimize the
practices described by Admiraal which are responsible for an estimated
8,000 to 10,000 deaths per year in Holland.1 58
Euthanasia has been an open secret among the Dutch and the rest of
Europe for many years. Dutch doctors have prescribed for themselves a
de facto procedure which has been supported and supplemented by court
decisions. 159 The patient must be fully conscious, with time to think
about this final decision. Medical and spiritual advisers who are "pre-
pared to disagree" must support the decision. 60 The patient must sign
an authorization. There is constant consultation with family members
and a last meeting with the patient, relatives, and doctor at which all are
counseled. Finally, the patient is given an injection which consists of one
drug to induce sleep and another to bring death.' 6 '
The Dutch procedure insists that the patient and doctor have con-
tact over many months, even years, and that the patient ask repeatedly
over time for the procedure. Terminal illness is not required, but the
patient must have physical and mental suffering judged to be unbearable,
with no prospect for improvement. In situations where a patient is in-
competent, however, there is no chance for this form of deliverance be-
cause it can be requested only by the patient. The patient's only option
would be a living will which can contain a provision for being put to
death.
In light of the fact that euthanasia remains illegal, Dutch doctors
are reluctant to acknowledge when it has occurred.' 62 In one case a doc-
tor who listed "unnatural death" on the death certificate of a forty year-
156. Id. at 6.
157. United Press International, Sept. 2, 1987 (available on LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file).
158. Id.
159. Tulsa World, Sept. 6, 1987, at D2, col. 1-6.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. It is estimated that a family doctor in Holland receives a request for euthanasia once every
two or three years, although it may be two or three times a year if the doctor has an elderly practice.
Haslach, supra note 153.
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old cancer victim underwent four separate police interrogations and was
forced to wait thirteen months before being told he would not be
prosecuted. 163
There is concern that AIDS patients from other countries might
flood into Holland. The Dutch emphasis on long term contact with the
patient, however, would seem to make that unlikely."6
VII. ANALYSIS
A number of factors indicate that euthanasia is no longer a topic to
be relegated to theoretical debates. The United States has a population
which is becoming dominated by senior citizens. Those citizens are at
times being kept alive by mechanical-medical achievements. Nursing
homes provide no answers, but merely add to the nightmare of those
languishing in a twilight zone of sedated near-death in an environment
more likely hostile than not, and civil at best.
It is no longer the elderly or a relatively small number of accident
victims who experience a grim existence. The spectre of AIDS has cre-
ated the population Alexander warned of: a group, ever-increasing in
size, for whom there is no cure, who defy the doctor's sense of omnipo-
tence. With this terrible plague the process of dying is ignominious, and
its potential victims well-informed of exactly what they will face. With
estimates that AIDS will soon afflict millions, a very real demand for an
answer to the euthanasia debate can be expected.
As discussed, those in opposition to euthanasia have presented their
case forcefully for generations. Fears of a return of Nazi regimes is an
argument that should not be lightly brushed aside. However, it should be
remembered that traditionally this country has been remarkable in its
adherence to the principles of our Constitution. The guarantees of our
system, with its checks and balances to protect the cherished rights of
citizens, provide a safeguard against the trampling of the individual by
the state. The Nazi atrocities were the actions of the state forced upon
individuals, not the actions of individuals making their own choices.
This slippery slope can be avoided by following the Holland ap-
proach: the individual's choice is determinative and the safeguards have
proven successful. The flaw in Holland's system, if there is one, is that
doctors still proceed at their own risk. Even when the most beneficent
163. Wall St. I., Aug. 21, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
164. Id. at 6, col. 2.
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motive is involved, the physician may have to bear the anxiety of await-
ing a decision by local prosecutors.
The legislation proposed by the Americans Against Human Suffer-
ing presents a well-reasoned approach which overcomes the flaw of Hol-
land's system. The choice of the individual is cherished above all others.
Safeguards are included to guarantee that the patient gives an informed
consent with desires clearly stated. Under such a statute, which protects
a physician from criminal or civil liability for putting into effect the
desires of a competent patient, multiple tragedies would be compassion-
ately avoided.'65
As Surgeon General Koop acknowledged, court decisions and legis-
lative action have brought the country a step away from accepting aid-in-
dying. The cases discussed above, among others, have shown that the
courts appreciate the rights of the individuals to be their own masters,
even when their wishes are presented by family, those who know and
love the patient. Based on those decisions, both competent and incompe-
tent patients can be freed from indignities and afforded deserved compas-
sion. Legislatures have also recognized that right in the individual in
most jurisdictions. Even the conservative voices of organized religion
have agreed that maintaining life beyond a certain point is not neces-
sary.16 6 It is simply in going that last step that segments of society
hesitate.
Unfortunately, the most recent court decisions reflect a trend away
from acceptance of active euthanasia. In its exhaustive, superbly rea-
soned 1987 trilogy of opinions, the New Jersey Supreme Court was care-
ful to note that the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining
treatment is not suicide and that the patient does not die from the with-
drawal or withholding, but rather from the underlying medical prob-
lem.167 Further, a dissenting opinion noted: "Thirteen new living will
statutes enacted ... last year included a prohibition against withholding
or withdrawing of artificial nutrition and hydration from terminally-ill
patients."' 68 These statutes were enacted in spite of the fact that a ma-
jority of Americans believe their physician should be able to help them
die if they are terminally ill.'6 9 Thus, it does not appear that courts or
165. Caplan, It's Time We Helped Patients Die, MED. ECON., June 8, 1987, at 214.
166. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
167. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 382, 529 A.2d 404, 428 (1987).
168. Id. at 390, 529 A.2d at 432.
169. Humphry, HEMLOCK Q., July, 1986, at 1. Sixty-two percent of those polled favored help in
dying according to the Roper Poll, April 26-May 3, 1986. Id.
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legislatures can be expected to readily endorse active euthanasia absent
active public support.
Nevertheless, there is a most compelling argument in support of aid-
in-dying, whether under the format proposed by Americans Against
Human Suffering or a hybrid version, and that argument is the fact that
the alternative has caused so much agony.
Joseph M. Hassman was a well-respected member of his community
in Berlin, New Jersey. He was a general practitioner who made house
calls and "forgot" to collect the bills of poor patients.17 ° In early 1986 he
visited his mother-in-law in a nursing home. She was incontinent, unable
to eat, and suffering from cerebral atrophy. "Dr. Joe" injected a lethal
dose of an analgesic into her nasogastric tube, and she died. Hassman
was charged with manslaughter, pled guilty, and was sentenced to two
years probation, a $10,000 fine, and 400 hours community service. His
medical license was revoked.
Cecil and Julia Saunders were devoted to each other. They were
always seen together until one day she fell, and he was too weak to lift
her. Julia was taken to a nursing home, and Cecil visited every day,
twelve hours a day. He became upset about the care she had been given
and brought her home to care for her and tend to her broken body.
When the stress, pain, and suffering came to be too much, Cecil and Julia
drove to a peaceful setting alongside oak trees. He fired two bullets into
her heart and one into his own. Death was instantaneous.
171
These are just two more examples of a mounting list of individuals
attempting to bring a peaceful end to their lives or to do the same for
someone they love. These are people who must risk reputations or sav-
age themselves because we have yet to achieve an understanding, legisla-
tive compassion.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In spite of the fact that a majority of the American public favors
physician's assistance in dying when the patient is faced with unbearable
suffering,1 72 the courts and legislatures are not prepared to endorse a sys-
tem of active euthanasia. If that majority believes that they should have
the choice to end pain that they cannot tolerate rather than allow it to
savage themselves and their loved ones, an endorsement of an initiative
170. Caplan, supra note 165, at 224.
171. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1984, at B6, col. 6.
172. Humphry, supra note 169.
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like the proposal of the Americans Against Human Suffering appears to
be the best chance at speaking that will.
Any plan that endorses active euthanasia must include the broadest
safeguards against abuse. Those safeguards should include the require-
ments of a written directive by a competent individual, and a terminal
condition without any reasonable hope for recovery. Medical and, if the
patient desires, spiritual advisors should consult with the patient and be
prepared to disagree. Furthermore, the directive should include the ap-
pointment of a surrogate for carrying out the will of the patient, includ-
ing the use of all possible life-sustaining procedures if the individual so
desires. Finally, a physician should be the only one authorized to per-
form the act. Although the physician's conduct should be closely scruti-
nized, there should be freedom from all civil or criminal liability if the
doctor acts in absolute good faith. In this way the right of the individual,
as provided by common law and guaranteed by the Constitution, will
prevail over the less compelling interests of the state in sustaining a life
that is condemned to an agonizing finale.
Government's compelling interests in sustaining life must give way
to the rights of the individual. An individual's natural acceptance of
pending death, especially when enveloped in unbearable suffering, is not
cause for the administration of anti-depressants. Rather it is the occasion
to show the individual respect by honoring a final request. 173 The time to
die is not necessarily at the end of horrid suffering. Only by accepting
this fact will our society reach a peaceful resolution of the current debate.
Once that level of respect is given the rights of the individual, with all
due procedural safeguards, we will have achieved the highest moral
order.
173. Caplan, supra note 145, at 216.
[Vol. 24:165
24
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss2/1
